On September 23, 2025, Estonian Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur stated that his country is open to hosting British F-35 jets capable of carrying nuclear weapons, emphasizing that “the door is always open for allies.” While not a formal acceptance of nuclear weapons on Estonian soil, the comment signals a willingness that could reshape NATO’s nuclear posture in the Baltic region. The statement comes just weeks after a reported incursion of a Russian MiG-31 into NATO airspace, underscoring heightened tensions along the alliance’s eastern flank.
The United Kingdom recently confirmed its procurement of 12 F-35A aircraft, the conventional takeoff and landing variant certified to deploy the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb. This acquisition complements the UK’s submarine-based Trident deterrent and adds an air-delivered nuclear strike capability to its force structure. Within NATO, the F-35A has become a key element of the nuclear-sharing arrangement, already adopted by Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy. By combining F-35B conventional strike power with the nuclear-capable F-35A, London reinforces its dual-layer deterrence strategy.
For Estonia, hosting such aircraft would bring NATO’s nuclear presence closer to Russian territory than at any time since the Cold War, placing advanced strike assets within reach of Russia’s Western Military District. While Tallinn’s stance remains a signal of openness rather than a concrete commitment, the move would likely provoke sharp responses from Moscow. Strategically, such a deployment would bolster deterrence and reassure allies but also increase the risk of escalation, pushing NATO’s deterrent posture to the edge of Russia’s borders and narrowing Moscow’s room for maneuver. The ongoing debate highlights the renewed sensitivity surrounding nuclear deterrence and its impact on Europe’s evolving security environment.
