On August 14, 2025, in an interview with The Japan Times, Ukraine’s military intelligence chief Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov revealed that North Korea is preparing not only to send engineering units but also to transfer armored vehicles and their crews to Russia. This development follows Pyongyang’s earlier confirmation of deploying 6,000 troops to the Kursk region for demining and infrastructure work.
Budanov stressed that while some North Korean soldiers will indeed be engaged in engineering and fortification tasks, it is unlikely that the entire contingent will be confined to such missions. Instead, plans reportedly include the transfer of 50 to 100 combat vehicles, notably BTR-80 armored personnel carriers and Cheonma-2 main battle tanks. Delivered with their own crews, these systems could be deployed directly on the Ukrainian front.
The Cheonma-2, North Korea’s latest main battle tank, was first showcased in 2020 during the 75th anniversary parade of the Workers’ Party. Weighing approximately 55 tons and powered by a 1,200-horsepower diesel engine, the tank mounts a 125 mm gun based on the Russian 2A46, an automatic grenade launcher, a 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun, and two Bulsae-3 anti-tank missiles. Its protection suite combines composite armor, explosive reactive panels, and active protection systems modeled on Russian and Chinese designs. The newest variants, seen in 2024 and 2025, feature a longer gun barrel and a GL6-type active protection system.
This move highlights a growing alignment between Moscow and Pyongyang, extending beyond the battlefield into strategic cooperation. For North Korea, participation provides diplomatic backing, energy and food supplies, and potential covert transfers of military technology in exchange for manpower and equipment. For Russia, it secures a steady flow of reinforcements despite Western sanctions, while signaling that it retains external partners willing to provide tangible support.
Although the arrival of North Korean tanks will not radically shift the balance of power in Ukraine, they could ease pressure on Russian formations by enabling greater troop rotation and logistical support. For Pyongyang, the war offers a unique chance to test its newest equipment, refine doctrines, and gain combat experience rarely available to other armies.
Budanov warned that Ukraine may increasingly serve as a testing ground for North Korea. With the prospective deployment of Cheonma-2 tanks and BTR-80 vehicles, Pyongyang is moving beyond peripheral involvement toward direct participation alongside Moscow. This underscores the transformation of the conflict from a bilateral confrontation into a wider arena of military experimentation with far-reaching strategic consequences.
